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THE HUGHES COURT AND RADICAL POLITICAL 
DISSENT: THE CASES OF DIRK DE JONGE AND 
ANGELO HERNDON 
Mark Tushnet1 
 
Scattered Supreme Court decisions in the early twentieth century 
dealt with the Constitution’s protection of freedom of speech.2 
Radical dissent over United States participation in World War I and 
the nation’s intervention against the Bolshevik revolution in Russia 
led the Court to its first sustained engagement with free speech cases. 
By the time Chief Justice Hughes took the center chair, the national 
government largely had abandoned its pursuit of radical dissenters, 
some of whom played large roles in the labor organizing that 
provided political support for the Roosevelt administration and, from 
1935 to 1939, in the Communist Party’s “Popular Front” that aligned 
the Party and its members and sympathizers with the administration. 
The Depression gave capitalism’s critics more opportunities to 
organize, and state governments occasionally went through local “red 
scares,” prosecuting such critics—particularly members of the newly 
organized Communist Party—who then raised free speech defenses. 
Today we may be inclined to associate robust protection of civil 
liberties with the legacy of the Roosevelt Court after 1937. But, the 
Hughes Court at least cut away some of the underbrush before the 
Court’s transformation. After laying out the doctrinal background for 
the Hughes Court’s decisions in Part I, this Article examines Hughes 
Court decisions involving political radicals in Part II. The Court’s 
“conservatives” and “liberals” were less divided on issues of civil 
liberties than today’s readers might think. The conservatives may 
have felt the tug of a moderate libertarianism that affected their 
approach to constitutional law generally; the liberals the tug of 
                                                                                                                 
 1. This Article is an expansion of the 47th Henry J. Miller Lecture given at Georgia State 
University Law School, October 1, 2010. I thank Professor Eric Segall and Dean Steven Kamenshine for 
the invitation to present the lecture. 
 2. See e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907). 
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advocacy for causes with which they shared some affinities even as 
they disagreed vigorously with radicals’ overall programs. And, 
constitutional doctrine mattered. 
I. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND 
At the start of the 1930s the constitutional law of free expression 
applicable to radical dissent fell into two categories, with one 
important collateral feature. The first category involved cases in 
which speakers were prosecuted because what they said had some 
possibility of leading to violations of some unquestionably valid 
law—what the cases called speech that in some sense caused a 
“substantive evil” that legislatures had a right to prevent. The second 
involved classic sedition laws, in which legislatures had outlawed 
some words or political doctrines as such, without requiring any 
showing in specific prosecutions that the doctrines had some causal 
connection to a substantive evil. The collateral feature was that the 
Court’s doctrines applied to cases involving prosecutions by state 
authorities as well as national ones. 
Schenck v. United States was the leading case in the first category.3 
Charles Schenck was an important figure in the Socialist Party. He 
helped prepare and distribute a pamphlet criticizing U.S. involvement 
in World War I, and in effect urging that young men refuse to register 
for the draft, which it described as little better than slavery and 
imprisonment. He was charged with violating the 1917 Espionage 
Act’s prohibition of “willfully caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military 
or naval forces of the United States, or willfully obstruct[ing] the 
recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.”4 Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s terse opinion upheld the prosecution against 
Schenck’s invocation of the First Amendment. 
                                                                                                                 
 3. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Cases applying the standard developed in Schenck. included Frohwerk v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
 4. 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (2006). 
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Justice Holmes’s thinking was influenced by the word “attempt” in 
the statute. As a scholar and state-court judge he had made important 
contributions to the development of the common law of attempts. In 
his l881 lectures on “The Common Law,” Justice Holmes pointed out 
that: 
The law does not punish every act which is done with the intent 
to bring about a crime. If a man starts from Boston to Cambridge 
for the purpose of committing a murder when he gets there, but 
is stopped by the draw and goes home, he is no more punishable 
than if he had sat in his chair and resolved to shoot somebody, 
but on second thoughts had given up the notion.5 
Judges had “puzzled where to draw the line,” but Justice Holmes 
argued that the principle was clear: “Public policy, that is to say, 
legislative considerations, are at the bottom of the matter; the 
considerations being . . . the nearness of the danger, the greatness of 
the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt.”6 As a judge on the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Justice Holmes applied this 
approach in Commonwealth v. Kennedy, where the defendant had 
been charged with attempted murder for mixing rat poison in his 
intended victim’s tea.7 Whether Kennedy’s actions were mere 
preparations, which could not be punished, or were a real attempt to 
murder depended on whether they were “near enough” to the 
intended harm: 
Every question of proximity must be determined by its own 
circumstances . . . . and the gravity of the crime, the uncertainty 
of the result, and the seriousness of the apprehension . . . would 
warrant holding the liability for an attempt to begin at a point 
more remote from the possibility of accomplishing what is 
                                                                                                                 
 5. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 68 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1881). 
 6. Id. 
 7. 48 N.E. 770 (Mass. 1897). 
3
Tushnet: The Hughes Court and Radical Political Dissent: The Case of Dirk
Published by Reading Room, 2012
336 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:2 
 
expected than might be the case with lighter crimes.8 
The question of proximity was generally for the jury to decide, 
although Justice Holmes reserved the possibility that courts could 
block attempt prosecutions where the actions were mere preparations 
too remote from the ultimate harm.9 
Justice Holmes began his First Amendment analysis in Schenck by 
conceding that “in many places and in ordinary times,” what Schenck 
had published would have been protected by the First Amendment.10 
But, he continued, “the character of every act depends upon the 
circumstances in which it is done.”11 Evoking the language he had 
used in describing criminal attempts, Justice Holmes wrote that: 
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in 
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear 
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive 
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of 
proximity and degree.12 
The war-time circumstances mattered: “When a nation is at war 
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance 
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men 
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right.”13 
Justice Holmes also wrote the Court’s opinion upholding the 
conviction of Eugene Victor Debs, the nation’s most prominent 
Socialist, for obstructing the draft in a speech where Debs had 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. at 771. 
 9. Leading scholarly treatments of the law of attempts echoed Justice Holmes’s approach. See J.H. 
Beale, Jr., Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV. L. REV. 491, 501 (1903) (asserting that what mattered was a 
“dangerous proximity to success,” which was “a question of degree.”); see also Francis Bowes Sayre, 
Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 846 (1928) (“It is thus manifestly impossible to lay down any 
mechanical or hard and fast rule for the drawing of the line between preparation and indictable 
attempts . . . .”). 
 10. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 52. 
 13. Id. 
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praised draft resisters and stated, “you need to know that you are fit 
for something better than slavery and cannon fodder.”14 He dissented, 
though, along with Justice Louis Brandeis, when the Court upheld the 
convictions of five Socialists from New York, who had printed a 
leaflet vigorously criticizing the United States’ intervention against 
the Russian Revolution, calling President Woodrow Wilson a 
coward, and urging workers to “wake up” and “throw away all 
confidence [in the government], . . . spit in the face the false, 
hypocritic, military propaganda which has fooled you so relentlessly, 
calling forth your sympathy, your help, to the prosecution of the 
war.”15 The defendants distributed the leaflet by throwing some 
copies off the roof of a building in New York.16 For the Court’s 
majority, the only issue in the case was whether the evidence 
supported the convictions, and in some sense that was the point on 
which Justice Holmes dissented. His premise was that Schenck and 
Debs had been correctly decided, but that the Court erred in finding 
that “the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown 
man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its 
opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have 
any appreciable tendency to do so.”17 For Justice Holmes, no jury 
could reasonably find that the actions, by defendants who he 
described as “poor and puny anonymities,” were done with the 
specific intent “to impede the United States in the war that it was 
carrying on,” rather than “to help Russia and stop American 
intervention there.”18 Justice Holmes then appended a paragraph on 
the theory of free speech, which continued to guide him and Brandeis 
over the succeeding decade but had no immediate influence on the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
                                                                                                                 
 14. 249 U.S. 211, 214 (1919). 
 15. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 620 (1919). 
 16. Id. at 618–19; see also RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (Cornell Univ. Press 1999). 
 17. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 18. Id. at 629. 
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logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and 
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express 
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow 
opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech 
impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or 
that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you 
doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have 
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come 
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached 
by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes 
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. 
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon 
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that 
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be 
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, 
unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with 
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate 
check is required to save the country.19 
Cases like Schenck and Debs could easily fit into the criminal-
attempts mold—requiring that a reasonable jury could find a 
dangerous proximity of success for inflicting the social harms of 
“substantive evils”—but the second set of cases could not. These 
cases involved statutes prohibiting words themselves, the doctrines of 
criminal syndicalism or criminal anarchy. New York and California 
had typical statutes. Enacted in the immediate aftermath of President 
William McKinley’s assassination by the self-described anarchist 
Leon Colgosz, New York’s statute defined criminal anarchy as “the 
doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force or 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 630. 
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violence, or by assassination of the executive head or any of the 
executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means,” and 
made it a crime to “advocate[], advise[], or teach[] the duty, 
necessity, or propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized 
government by force or violence.”20 California enacted its statute in 
1919, a legislative reaction to the rise of radical dissent in World War 
I. It prohibited “criminal syndicalism,” which the statute defined as: 
any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and 
abetting the commission of crime, sabotage (which word is 
hereby defined as meaning willful and malicious physical 
damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of force 
and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of 
accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control or 
effecting any political change.21 
Criminal anarchy statutes differed from the Espionage Act. The 
latter identified substantive evils such as draft obstruction or 
interference with war efforts. It could be violated by sabotaging 
weapons and like, activities that were not protected by the First 
Amendment under any sensible interpretation. Schenck’s prosecution 
rested on the proposition that his words could cause a substantive 
evil. The criminal-attempt model required that reasonable juries be 
able to find that such words were sufficiently “close”—proximate—
to the substantive evil to warrant punishment. Criminal anarchy 
statutes, in contrast, made the words themselves the offense. A 
prosecutor had to show only that the defendant had made statements 
that fit the statutory definition of advocacy of the prohibited doctrine. 
Put another way, the substantive evil such statutes targeted was 
speech itself. 
With some pulling and hauling, one could force criminal anarchy 
statutes into the attempt model: Legislatures enacted such statutes 
                                                                                                                 
 20. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 160, 161 (Consol. 1909); see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654 
(1925) (quoting the text of the statute); FRANK B. GILBERT, CRIMINAL LAW AND PRACTICE OF NEW 
YORK 46 (3d. ed., 1920) (quoting the text of the statute). 
 21. 1919 Cal. Stat. 281. 
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because they believed that the dissemination of the ideas of criminal 
anarchy would eventually cause some other substantive evils such as 
sabotage or attempted revolution. But, under the general theory of 
police powers that everyone on the Supreme Court accepted, 
including Justices Holmes and Brandeis, a government could enforce 
its police-power regulations without showing in each case that 
violating the regulation created a “dangerous proximity of success” 
in causing harm.22 A provision of the New York statute in Lochner, 
for example, prohibited bakers from sleeping where bread was 
produced.23 The statute’s purpose was obvious: Such arrangements 
created a risk that human waste products would work their way into 
the bread produced nearby. No one thought, though, that a bakery 
owner could defend against a prosecution for letting workers sleep in 
the bakery by demonstrating that no waste products had in fact 
contaminated the bread. 
Perhaps the First Amendment imposed a more stringent 
requirement, but exactly what the requirement could be was unclear. 
The substantive evils that led legislatures to enact criminal anarchy 
statutes were themselves punished under other criminal laws. If the 
First Amendment required in a criminal anarchy prosecution that the 
prosecutor demonstrate a dangerous proximity to successful 
sabotage, the criminal anarchy statute added nothing to the existing 
prohibition on attempted sabotage. 
The Supreme Court’s majority understood all this when it 
considered criminal anarchy prosecutions in the 1920s. Communist 
Party activities led prosecutors in New York, California, and 
Michigan to charge prominent Party leaders with criminal anarchy or 
syndicalism. Michigan prosecuted Charles Ruthenberg, the Party’s 
executive secretary; New York prosecuted Benjamin Gitlow, a 
leading member of the Communist faction that broke away from the 
Socialist Party in 1919; and California prosecuted Anita Whitney, a 
member of a prominent and wealthy California family who had 
helped organize the Communist Party there. 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Beale, supra note 9. 
 23. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46 n.* (1905) (providing the statute at issue). 
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Gitlow’s case got to the Supreme Court first. He had been convicted 
for publishing and distributing the Communist Party’s “manifesto,” 
which, as Justice Edward Sanford put it: 
advocated, in plain and unequivocal language, the necessity of 
accomplishing the ‘Communist Revolution’ by a militant and 
‘revolutionary Socialism,’ based on ‘the class struggle’ and 
mobilizing the ‘power of the proletariat in action,’ through mass 
industrial revolts developing into mass political strikes and 
‘revolutionary mass action,’ for the purpose of conquering and 
destroying the parliamentary state and establishing in its place, 
through a ‘revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat,’ the 
system of Communist Socialism.24 
Gitlow’s lawyers argued that his conviction should be overturned 
because the jury had been instructed that it could convict him simply 
for advocating violent revolution, without any showing that the 
Manifesto’s distribution was likely to have any concrete result. The 
statute, they said, therefore punished “the mere utterance, as such, of 
‘doctrine’ having no quality of incitement, without regard either to 
the circumstances of its utterance or to the likelihood of unlawful 
sequences.”25 
Justice Sanford’s majority opinion observed that, as construed by 
the state courts, New York’s criminal anarchy statute did not 
“penalize the utterance or publication of abstract ‘doctrine’ or 
academic discussion having no quality of incitement to any concrete 
action.”26 Rather, “[w]hat it prohibits is language advocating, 
advising, or teaching the overthrow of organized government by 
unlawful means,” words that “impl[ied] urging to action.”27 Free 
speech was “an inestimable privilege in a free government,” but 
everyone agreed, Sanford wrote, that it could be limited, for 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 657–58 (1925). 
 25. Id. at 664. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 664–65. 
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otherwise “it might become the scourge of the republic.”28 The state 
could use its police power to: 
punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to 
the public welfare . . . . And, for yet more imperative reasons, a 
State may punish utterances endangering the foundations of 
organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful 
means. These imperil its own existence as a constitutional 
State.29 
New York’s legislature had “determined . . . that utterances 
advocating the overthrow of organized government by force . . . are 
so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of 
substantive evil” that they could be prohibited under the state’s police 
power.30 
What, though, of the argument that the government had not shown 
that any untoward action was likely to occur? For the Court, that 
argument missed the point. New York’s legislature had made a 
judgment that criminal anarchy created a risk of substantive evils. 
The courts had to defer to that judgment, as long as it was reasonable. 
And it surely was, Justice Sanford said. Statements advocating 
criminal anarchy “by their very nature, involve danger to the public 
peace . . . . And the immediate danger is none the less real and 
substantial, because the effect of a given utterance cannot be 
accurately foreseen.”31 Justice Sanford employed a vivid metaphor: 
“A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for 
a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration.”32 
New York was not “acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when . . . it 
seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled 
the flame or blazed into the conflagration.”33 That was enough to 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 667. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925). 
 31. Id. at 669. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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show that the statue was constitutional. Then, just as in the case of 
barring sleeping quarters in bakeries, it did not matter that the 
government did not try to show that Gitlow’s statements were 
“likely, in and of [themselves], to bring about the substantive evil.”34 
All that mattered was whether Gitlow’s statements came “within the 
prohibited class.”35 
Justice Sanford distinguished Schenck. The Espionage Act “merely 
prohibits certain acts involving the danger of substantive evil, 
without any reference to language itself.”36 In Schenck the 
government applied the statute to the defendant’s language. Because 
Congress had not made any judgment that Schenck’s words posed a 
threat of substantive evil, judges and juries necessarily had to 
determine whether the words he used posed a sufficient threat of the 
social harm Congress had identified, obstruction of the draft or 
interference with the war effort and the like. The clear-and-present-
danger test, a reformulation of the requirement of a dangerous 
proximity of success, “has no application to [cases] . . . where the 
legislative body itself has previously determined the danger of 
substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified character.”37 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented, in a three-paragraph 
opinion by Justice Holmes, in which he insisted that the clear-and-
present-danger test should be applied. Picking up on Justice 
Sanford’s metaphor, Justice Holmes wrote, 
Every idea is an incitement . . . . The only difference between the 
expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense 
is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire 
to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant 
discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present 
conflagration.38 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 670. 
 35. Id. at 670. 
 36. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1935). 
 37. Id. at 671. 
 38. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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The opinion did not confront Justice Sanford’s argument that the test 
Justice Holmes preferred made sense when the legislature had not 
identified words themselves as the substantive evil, but not when it 
had done so. 
Justice Brandeis was even more eloquent in his classic opinion, 
effectively a dissent, when the Court affirmed Anita Whitney’s 
conviction for violating California’s criminal syndicalism law.39 
Again Justice Sanford wrote the majority’s opinion, which added 
nothing analytically significant to First Amendment doctrine but only 
restated what Gitlow had held.40 Justice Brandeis thought that the 
Court did not have jurisdiction to consider Whitney’s free speech 
claim, but incorporated into his separate opinion the dissent he had 
been ready to file in the case of Charles Ruthenberg, convicted of 
violating Michigan’s similar law. Ruthenberg’s appeal was dismissed 
when he died, but Justice Brandeis wanted to get his views on the 
record.41 Justice Brandeis spent a few sentences attempting to 
discredit the distinction the majority offered between Schenck and 
Gitlow: “The Legislature must obviously decide, in the first instance, 
whether a danger exists which calls for a particular protective 
measure. But where a statute is valid only in case certain conditions 
exist, the enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts 
which are essential to its validity.”42 This rebuttal rested on the 
implicit proposition that the “certain condition” that had to exist was 
a substantial likelihood of illegal action, but Justice Sanford’s 
analysis defended criminal anarchy laws on the ground that the 
“condition” for their enactment was a judgment that specific 
utterances posed a risk that illegal action would ensue. And Sanford 
did not take the statute’s enactment as “establishing” that such a risk 
existed. Rather, employing what he called deference to the 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Ronald Collins & David Skover, Curious Concurrence: Justice Brandeis’s Vote in Whitney 
v. California, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 333 (2006). 
 42. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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legislature, he found that the legislature had made a reasonable 
judgment about risk.43 
Justice Brandeis’s concern went far beyond what he clearly 
believed was the merely technical distinction between Schenck and 
Gitlow. In some of the most passionate and eloquent words in the 
United States Reports, Brandeis offered a full account of free 
speech’s values and of why governments could not be trusted to 
regulate speech: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of 
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and 
that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over 
the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. 
They believed liberty to [be] the secret of happiness and courage 
to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the 
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech 
and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, 
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the 
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political 
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government. They recognized the risks to which all 
human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot 
be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; 
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; 
that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate 
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the 
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed 
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good 
ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public 
discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument 
of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies 
of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. 
13
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free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free 
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is 
the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational 
fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be 
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free 
speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe 
that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be 
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a 
serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some 
measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of 
it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. 
Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of 
the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. 
Advocacy of lawbreaking heightens it still further. But even 
advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a 
justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls 
short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the 
advocacy would be immediately acted on . . . . Those who won 
our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not 
fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of 
liberty. To courageous, selfreliant men, with confidence in the 
power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the 
processes of popular government, no danger flowing from 
speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of 
the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before 
there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose 
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil 
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more 
speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify 
repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled 
with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the 
Constitution.44 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at 375-77 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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But these words, powerful as they were, were written in what was 
functionally a dissent from the majority’s analysis of the First 
Amendment claim. The majority’s more generous view toward 
criminal anarchy laws was the law when Justice Hughes became 
Chief Justice. 
Finally, free speech doctrine had to deal with the fact that the First 
Amendment’s terms referred only to the national government: 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”45 
The cases arising out of World War I involved prosecutions by that 
government, and the First Amendment unquestionably applied to 
such prosecutions. State attacks on radical dissent raised a different 
legal question. States were barred only from denying “due process of 
law,” which the Court in the Lochner line of cases had interpreted to 
mean that states could not infringe on fundamental liberties.46 The 
Lochner approach was controversial, though, and some supporters of 
free speech were uncomfortable with protecting free speech as a 
fundamental liberty protected only by the due process clause. As 
Justice Brandeis grudgingly put it in his opinion in Whitney, “Despite 
arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is 
settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of 
procedure.”47 
Further, the principles articulated in due process cases seemed to 
give governments greater leeway than those articulated in the Court’s 
World War I free speech decisions. Schenck drew the clear-and-
present-danger test from the criminal law of attempts,48 but it was 
hardly obvious that state courts could not modify the common law 
rules regarding criminal attempts, and so it was hardly obvious that 
the clear-and-present-danger test set the due process limit to state 
government power. 
The Court finessed the problem. In 1907, upholding a conviction 
for contempt of court through publication of articles and cartoons 
                                                                                                                 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 46. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 47. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 48. Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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criticizing the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Holmes wrote, “We 
leave undecided the question whether there is to be found in the 14th 
Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the 1st,” because “even if 
we were to assume that freedom of speech and freedom of the press 
were protected from abridgments on the part not only of the United 
States but also of the states,” the defendant would lose anyway 
because “the main purpose” of the constitutional provision was to 
prevent prior restraints on publication, not to bar punishment after 
publication.49 In Gitlow the Court went a bit further. Justice Edward 
Sanford “assume[d] that the freedom of speech and of the press—
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by 
Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
from impairment by the States.”50 As Zechariah Chafee observed in a 
comment on Gitlow, this was a “new gain, the possibility of federal 
protection against state suppression. A more liberal court may 
prevent a checker-board nation, with ultra-conservative states into 
which moderately radical Americans come at peril of imprisonment 
for sedition.”51 But, he noted, “[n]ot much can be hoped today.”52 
The Due Process Clause had another function, applicable in cases 
involving much more than speech. The clause was a guarantee of 
fundamental fairness in the state’s treatment of those subject to its 
authority. At its core, the clause required that states let people know 
which of their activities violated the criminal law. Statutes had to be 
clear enough to give notice.53 If a criminal offense could be 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Schneck, also written by Justice Holmes, 
backed away from this last conclusion: “It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the 
freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the 
main purpose . . . .” 249 U.S. at 51–52. 
 50. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 51. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THE INQUIRING MIND 106 (De Capo Press, 1974) (reprinted from 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Gitlow Case, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 1, 1925). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (Justice Sutherland noted: 
“That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those 
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well-
recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; 
and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first 
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/2
2012] RADICAL POLITICAL DISSENT 349 
 
committed in several ways, the instructions had to make those 
differences clear, so that defendants could focus their arguments, and 
jurors focus their deliberations, appropriately. The First Amendment 
fed into these fairness concerns. A statute’s terms might suggest that 
it could be violated in many ways, some of which were clearly 
protected by the First Amendment. A jury had to be instructed that it 
could not convict a defendant based only upon evidence that the 
defendant had violated the statute in a way protected by the 
Constitution. 
The First Amendment as it had been interpreted in the federal 
cases arising out of World War I and as it had been assumed to apply 
in the state cases of the 1920s framed the Hughes Court’s treatment 
of radical dissent. A theory that offered robust protection for radical 
dissent had been eloquently stated, but only in dissent. The Hughes 
Court’s decisions ended up protecting many dissenters, but not by 
directly invoking the First Amendment. They were due process 
decisions influenced by the First Amendment. 
II. POLITICAL RADICALS IN THE NEW DEAL ERA 
Radicals in the United States were critical supporters of the New 
Deal in two senses: They played an important role in generating 
political support for the New Deal, especially as labor organizers, but 
many of them argued that the New Deal did not go nearly far enough, 
and saw it as much a defense of capitalism as the beginning of a 
socialist transformation. It was at least symbolically appropriate for 
the Court to take up its next criminal syndicalism case in 1936, as it 
was confronting the Roosevelt administration on the constitutionality 
of the New Deal.54 
A. Dirk De Jonge and Labor Defense 
Longshoremen in Portland, Oregon, were on strike in July 1934. 
The strike occasioned violence, and four of the strikers were shot by 
                                                                                                                 
essential of due process of law.”). 
 54. See generally De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
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police officers. Dirk De Jonge, a Communist and longshoreman, 
organized a meeting to protest the police action.55 Somewhere 
between 150 and 300 people attended the meeting, which was 
sponsored by the Communist Party, although only a few dozen of 
those attending were Communists.56 De Jonge was the second 
speaker on the program. He criticized conditions at the local jail, and 
described the police actions against the strikers as “attacks upon the 
working class” to break the strike.57 He asked his listeners to buy 
Communist Party literature and to help increase the Party’s 
membership.58 Police officers raided the meeting, arresting De Jonge 
and other speakers. He was charged with violating Oregon’s criminal 
syndicalism law by “conducting” the meeting, at which speakers 
“taught and advocated the doctrines of criminal syndicalism and 
sabotage.”59 According to Harry Gross, one of De Jonge’s lawyers, 
the prosecution had been arranged with the assistance of the local 
“Citizen’s Emergency League,” which the lawyer described as “a 
local vigilante group organized by the Chamber of Commerce during 
the strike.”60 The state appointed a special prosecutor to try the case, 
again according to Gross “at the request of . . . a group of 
commanders of the local posts” of veterans’ organizations such as the 
American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars.61 In addition to 
showing what had happened at the meeting, the prosecutor 
introduced excerpts from Communist literature into the record. 
Gross was joined in defending De Jonge by three other lawyers 
from the International Labor Defense (the ILD).62 The ILD was 
created in 1925.63 Supported by the Soviet Union and taking the 
“international” in its name seriously, the ILD’s goals were “to defend 
all persecuted for their activity in the labor movement, to defend the 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id. at 359–60. 
 56. Id. at 358. 
 57. State v. De Jonge, 51 P.2d 674, 676 (Or. 1935). 
 58. Id. at 681. 
 59. Harry L. Gross, Vigilante Justice in Oregon, THE NATION, Dec. 26, 1934, at 742. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Gross, supra note 59, at 742. 
 63. Charles H. Martin, The International Labor Defense and Black America, 26 LABOR HIST. 165, 
167 (1985). 
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struggles of the national minorities, and to support the families of 
victims of ruling class terror.”64 It responded to a dilemma faced by 
political radicals of a Marxist bent. They were in an awkward 
position when they defended their actions by invoking their 
constitutional rights. Their theory of law and society implied that 
law, even constitutional law, was a reflection of basic power 
relations, a tool of the ruling class to suppress the working class. As 
the ILD’s head noted, the organization’s purpose was “to destroy the 
illusions of a democracy and justice above classes, and to expose 
their class character.”65 How could radicals expect judges, who were 
among the elites in the ruling class, to interpret the law to immunize 
political radicals from persecution and prosecution? As The New 
Republic put it in commenting on a long sentence imposed by a 
Georgia court on a Communist organizer, “Even a paper as 
conservative as the New York Herald Tribune has protested the 
outrageous injustice of this sentence, which goes far to prove what 
the Communists have long charged about capitalist-ruled courts, in 
the Deep South and elsewhere.”66 
To a large extent the Communists did not harbor great expectations 
of judges. Their main defense of invoking the Constitution when they 
were prosecuted lay not in hopes of vindication in court but in what 
they called “labor defense.”67 Labor defense treated prosecutions as 
occasions for organizing support for radicals. Prosecutions 
demonstrated that capitalist “rule of law” was a sham, discarded as 
soon as the ruling class felt threatened by radical dissent. Labor 
defense exposed that sham through publicity and demonstrations. 
The Industrial Workers of the World organized “free speech fights” 
from 1909 to 1913, but these fights were disruptive demonstrations in 
the streets, not invocations of the law in courtrooms.68 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. at 167 (quoting the ILD program). 
 65. Id. (quoting William L. Patterson). 
 66.  This Week, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 1, 1933, at 309. 
 67. For a discussion, see REBECCA N. HILL, MEN, MOBS, AND LAW: ANTI-LYNCHING AND LABOR 
DEFENSE IN U.S. RADICAL HISTORY (2008). 
 68. For a discussion of the free-speech campaigns, see WILLIAM PRESTON, ALIENS AND 
DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903–1933, at 43–55 (2d. ed., Harvard Univ. Press 
1966). 
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The best vehicles for labor defense were prosecutions that could be 
described as frame-ups of innocent defendants—at least, defendants 
who were innocent of the crimes with which they were charged. 
Campaigns against the continued imprisonment of Tom Mooney, 
convicted for setting a bomb that killed ten and injured forty at a 
“Preparedness Day” celebration in San Francisco in 1916, and of the 
execution of Joe Hill, for murdering a Salt Lake City butcher and his 
son in 1914, and of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, convicted 
in 1921 of a robbery and murder in South Braintree, Massachusetts, 
foreshadowed the development of labor defense as a weapon for 
using prosecutions as an organizing device.69 
Labor defense worked best when its organizers could credibly 
claim that the victims were being framed, as they could in the cases 
prominent during the 1920s. Lawyers who accepted the theory could 
ask juries to acquit, even in the face of evidence, and thereby to 
demonstrate how working people could stand up to the ruling class. 
After conviction, the theory of labor defense had to confront the 
difficulty that the lawyers were attempting to persuade members of 
the ruling class to let political radicals go free in the face of a jury’s 
decision that they had violated the law. This was made even more 
awkward when the defendants were convicted of political offenses 
rather than ordinary crimes. Radicals were proud of their political 
positions, and were uncomfortable at best in claiming that they had 
not made the speeches or published the pamphlets that were at the 
basis of the charges against them. Mooney, Hill, and Sacco and 
Vanzetti might have been framed for murder, but political radicals 
were not being framed when they were charged with offenses that 
were defined by their radical views. 
The advocates of labor defense never fully worked out how 
appeals to higher courts fit into radical political theory. Trumpeting 
one victory, Communist leader Earl Browder declared, “The higher 
court was forced by the pressure of aroused mass opinion and protest 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Representative of a large literature are RICHARD H. FROST, THE MOONEY CASE (1968); GIBBS 
M. SMITH, JOE HILL (1969) and MOSHIK TEMKIN, THE SACCO-VANZETTI AFFAIR: AMERICA ON TRIAL 
(2009). 
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to set aside the verdict . . . .”70 Similarly, ILD leader William 
Patterson asserted, “Not legal pressure alone, but mass pressure, into 
which the legal defense is merged, has forced the capitalist courts . . . 
to grant a new trial.”71 Yet, exactly how mass pressure could force 
capitalist courts to do anything was obscure. One promising path lay 
in describing political prosecutions as “legal lynchings.” Doing so 
allowed the lawyers to seek relief from one segment of the ruling 
class—the judges of the national courts, especially the Supreme 
Court—against decisions made by a more parochial segment of the 
ruling class, particularly judges in southern courts. The idea was that 
sophisticated political elites would understand that legal lynchings 
undermined the credibility of the general claim that the capitalist rule 
of law was fundamentally fair and generally involved defendants 
who posed no real threat to the capitalist economic, social, and 
political order. The contrast The New Republic drew between the 
conservative New York newspaper and the Georgia courts suggests 
this line of argument.72 
The lawyers defending political radicals also appealed to liberals 
who had civil libertarian inclinations, and in several important cases 
liberal lawyers played important roles in the appeals to the higher 
courts. Felix Frankfurter, for example, was prominently associated 
with the campaign to free Sacco and Vanzetti, in 1927 publishing a 
book, based on a long magazine article he had written, offering a 
“critical analysis” of the case.73 Rebecca Hill suggests that anarchists 
and liberals “bonded over . . . a belief in the importance of individual 
ideas—and individualism.”74 The combination of labor defense with 
civil libertarianism was more awkward. Labor defense treated 
appeals to the Constitution as purely instrumental, likely to succeed 
only under special conditions, while civil libertarians had a principled 
commitment to the constitutional claims being made. Judges 
                                                                                                                 
 70. CHARLES H. MARTIN, THE ANGELO HERNDON CASE AND SOUTHERN JUSTICE 15 (1976). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Editorial, The Herndon Case, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 1935, at 230-31. 
 73. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR 
LAWYERS AND LAYMEN (1927). 
 74. HILL, supra note 67, at 189. 
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considering appeals in cases where a strenuous labor defense had 
been mounted might well have been suspicious of the sincerity with 
which the defendants’ lawyers were invoking the Constitution. Still, 
suspicious or not, they had to deal with the legal arguments as such. 
As the 1930s proceeded, political radicals developed another way 
of explaining their reliance on the Constitution in their defense. 
Captured best in the Communist Party slogan adopted during the 
Popular Front period after 1935, “Communism is 20th Century 
Americanism”75 radicals located themselves within the American 
constitutional tradition rather than outside or against it. Claude 
Bowers, a journalist and historian, wrote of the conflict between 
Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton as a preview of modern 
battles against large corporations, a “clear-cut fight between 
democracy and aristocracy,” as he put it in his preface, and the 
“spirits of Jefferson and Hamilton still stalk the ways of man—still 
fighting,” as he put it on the last page of the volume.76 For Bowers, 
Jefferson’s opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts was the true 
American tradition of liberty. The Alien and Sedition Acts 
inaugurated what Bowers called a “Reign of Terror” throughout the 
country.77 The phrase’s resonance with the terminology of a “Red 
Scare” used a few years earlier could not have been clearer. In this 
view political radicals who took a “Jeffersonian” position against 
those who Bowers called “terrorists” who suppressed speech were 
continuing America’s best tradition.78 
De Jonge’s defense was a modest example of labor defense in 
action. During the three weeks the trial consumed, De Jonge’s 
supporters filled the courtroom, wearing red badges. At trial the ILD 
lawyers repeatedly challenged the special prosecutor’s references to 
De Jonge “as a ‘rat,’ a dangerous radical, and a liar.”79 The lawyers 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Communists: Rain Check on Revolution, TIME MAGAZINE, May 30, 1938. 
 76. CLAUDE BOWERS, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
vii, 511 (1926). Roosevelt appointed Bowers ambassador to Spain, where he served from 1933, and then 
to Chile, where he served until his resignation and retirement after Dwight Eisenhower’s election, in 
1953. 
 77. Id. at 386. 
 78. Id. at 387. 
 79. Gross, supra note 59, at 742. 
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were told that the jury was initially divided evenly on whether to 
convict De Jonge, then eight-to-four for conviction.80 The judge re-
read the instructions to the jury, and a few hours later two jurors 
agreed to vote for conviction if the jury also recommended a lenient 
sentence.81 Because in Oregon only ten votes were needed to convict 
that was what happened: a conviction by a ten-to-two vote, with a 
recommendation for leniency.82 The judge, not bound by the 
recommendation, sentenced De Jonge to seven years in prison rather 
than the maximum possible sentence of ten years.83 De Jonge’s trial 
exemplified labor defense in its almost-successful appeal to jurors 
directly, and in his lawyers’ characterization of the case as involving 
vigilante justice.84 
Osmond K. Fraenkel, a New York lawyer affiliated with the New 
York Liberties Committee, not then a branch of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, took over the case when it reached the Supreme 
Court. With a “political bias to the left,” Fraenkel was a committed 
civil libertarian who believed that “people should do whatever they 
wanted as long as they didn’t hurt anybody else.”85 
The precise charge against De Jonge turned out to be crucial. He 
violated the criminal syndicalism statute, the indicatment said, by 
“presid[ing] at . . . [and] conducting an assemblage of persons . . . the 
Communist Party, which . . . was . . . teaching and advocating . . . the 
doctrine of criminal syndicalism and sabotage.”86 A police 
undercover agent testified at De Jonge’s trial about incidents in 
which Communists suggested that members rob banks to get money 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at 743. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Gross, supra note 59; see also Cathy Howard, The Case of Dirk De Jonge, PORTLAND 
OREGONIAN, NORTHWEST MAGAZINE, Mar. 28, 1976, at 9 (I thank Seneca Gray and Tung Yin for 
locating a copy of this article.). Two judges of the Oregon Supreme Court would have reversed De 
Jonge’s conviction because of the admission of hearsay evidence, the testimony about bank robberies, 
and the special prosecutor’s improper appeals to passion. They also criticized the length of De Jonge’s 
sentence. State v. De Jonge, 51 P.2d 674, 684–87 (Or. 1935). 
 85. David Margolick, Osmond K. Fraenkel Dies at 94; Former Counsel to the A.C.L.U., N.Y. 
TIMES, May 17, 1983, at B6; Roger K. Newman, Fraenkel, Osmond K., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 200 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). 
 86. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 361 (1937). 
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for a trip to Russia, but no evidence showed that De Jonge had made 
similar statements. Fraenkel’s brief repeatedly sounded one theme: 
The charge allowed a conviction simply for helping to organize a 
meeting sponsored by the Communist Party, and that was all the 
evidence showed De Jonge had done. No evidence showed that 
anyone had advocated criminal syndicalism or sabotage at the 
meeting, nor did it show that the meeting was one of the Communist 
Party; it showed only that the Communist Party generally—in its 
overall teaching—advocated criminal syndicalism. As Fraenkel put 
it, the statute as construed by the state courts did not punish 
“assistance to an organization ‘to advocate’” criminal syndicalism, 
but rather “mere assistance to an organization ‘which advocates’” 
that doctrine.87 So, Fraenkel wrote, the question for the Court was 
“whether a statute is constitutional which punishes a person for 
participation in a lawful meeting, called for a lawful purpose, merely 
because the meeting was called by an organization which, it is 
charged, advocated prohibited doctrines.”88 Under the state court’s 
decision, “any person could be convicted who participated in a 
symposium called by the Communist Party for the discussion of the 
campaign issues of the current year, were such a person a Democrat, 
a Republican, or a member of any other political party.”89 After 
distinguishing Whitney on the ground that Oregon’s legislature had 
never determined that activities like De Jonge’s were dangerous, 
Fraenkel returned to the “guilt by association” theme: “If the 
conviction in this case can be sustained, then anyone who speaks at a 
meeting called by the Communist Party for any purpose whatsoever 
might likewise be convicted.”90 
The state’s brief verged on incompetence. It did little more than 
pile quotation upon quotation from decisions by the Supreme Court 
and by state courts. A short passage asserting, “By making it a crime 
to preside at, conduct, or assist in conducting a meeting of the 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Brief for Appellant, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1936) (No. 123), 1936 WL 39965 at 
*12. 
 88. Id. at *7. 
 89. Id. at *8. 
 90. Id. 
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Communist Party, meetings of such an organization are prevented,”91 
showed that the state’s lawyers simply did not understand the 
distinction Fraenkel drew, and Chief Justice Hughes pressed the point 
at oral argument. The fact that Fraenkel’s oral argument consumed 
only eight minutes suggested the Court’s inclinations.92 
The Supreme Court returned from its December break on January 
4, 1937, just a month after it had heard the arguments in De Jonge. 
Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.93 
Written with what the New York Times called his “characteristic . . . 
tight-lipped reasoning and . . . a restrained emotion which often rises 
to real eloquence,”94 Chief Justice Hughes’s opinion continued along 
the path of developing an affirmative theory of the First Amendment. 
As Chief Justice Hughes understood the case, De Jonge was 
convicted simply because “he had assisted in the conduct of a public 
meeting, albeit otherwise lawful, which was held under the auspices 
of the Communist Party.”95 That De Jonge was in fact a Communist 
was irrelevant to the charge. 
A like fate might have attended any speaker . . . . However 
innocuous the object of the meeting, however lawful the subjects 
and tenor of the addresses, however reasonable and timely the 
discussion, all those assisting in the conduct of the meeting 
would be subject to imprisonment as felons if the meeting were 
held by the Communist Party.96 
Discussions of tariffs, foreign policy, taxation, relief—all might lead 
to criminal liability for participants, were the discussion sponsored by 
the Communist Party. Legislatures could address abuses of 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Brief for Appellee at 30, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (No.123), 1936 WL 40125 at 
*29. 
 92. Id.; Supreme Court Justices Question Closely Oregon’s Argument in Communist’s Appeal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1936, at 13; NEWMAN, supra note 85. 
 93. Justice Stone did not participate because of his recent illness. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, 
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 94. Editorial, The Right of Free Assembly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1937, at 22. 
 95. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937). 
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constitutional rights, but “[t]he rights themselves must not be 
curtailed.”97 
Chief Justice Hughes then offered a statement of First Amendment 
theory focusing on the role speech and assembly had in democratic 
government: 
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from 
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and 
violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate 
the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free 
assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political 
discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the 
will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained 
by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the 
very foundation of constitutional government.98 
The First Amendment protected the ability of the American people to 
change the policies their government pursued, and even the form of 
their government, by peaceful means. De Jonge and others were 
“entitled to discuss the public issues of the day and thus in a lawful 
manner, without incitement to violence or crime, to seek redress of 
alleged grievances.”99 Chief Justice Hughes stated a broad rule: 
“[P]eaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a 
crime.”100 Criminal syndicalists might be prosecuted for whatever 
crimes they committed “elsewhere.” But the government could not 
“seize[] upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a 
lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.”101 
Editorial reactions to the De Jonge decision showed how 
protecting free expression could appeal to liberals and conservatives. 
The Portland Oregonian wrote that the decision rejected “the red-
baiting witch hunts which have characterized some of our 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Id. at 365. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937). 
26
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/2
2012] RADICAL POLITICAL DISSENT 359 
 
officialdom and part of our press here in Oregon,” and a columnist 
said that it showed “that we are making headway against the fascist 
drift in this country.”102 To the New York Times, the decision showed 
that judges “who have so often been described as narrow-minded 
reactionaries” could “let the breath of life and liberty” into Oregon, 
“one of the most progressive and liberal-minded states.”103 To the 
Chicago Daily Tribune the decision “ought to strengthen the 
restraints upon hasty impulse in lawmaking” at a time when the 
“mood” and the “most powerful leadership” of the American people 
“show little regard for the dangers of legislative haste under pressure 
of public excitement.”104 All constitutional limitations, not merely the 
First Amendment, were designed to protect the nation from 
“impulsive lawmaking” enacted during moments of “public 
excitement,” when the people “disregard permanent considerations in 
the pursuit of an immediate object.”105 “A wise people,” the Tribune 
said, 
will wish to protect themselves from their own moments of 
passionate impulse and hasty decision, . . . [f]or what seems to be 
our will at the moment may be and often has been the defeat of 
our real will, obscured for the moment by passion, but expressed 
in the enduring principles our reason cherishes.106 
The implicit reference was of course to Roosevelt and the New Deal, 
in the aftermath of the Democrats’ electoral victory in 1936 and on 
the eve of Roosevelt’s challenge to the Court. 
B. Angelo Herndon and Sedition in Georgia 
Starting in March 1930, Atlanta’s police, directed by prosecutor 
John Hudson, conducted a series of raids on meetings organized by 
members of the Communist Party, dispatched to the region to help 
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organize workers and relief recipients. Eventually Joseph Carr, an 
eighteen-year-old Communist, and five others were indicted for 
attempting to incite insurrection, under a statute dating from the pre-
Civil War years. The Communists saw Atlanta as fertile ground 
because, facing severe shortfalls in income, the city had cut its 
expenditures on relief—as well as salaries for public officials. On 
June 30, 1932, about one thousand marchers organized by 
Communists under Angelo Herndon’s leadership demonstrated at the 
doors of the city council in the local courthouse building.107 Herndon 
was arrested eleven days later, for violating the anti-insurrection 
statute.108 
Herndon, born in southern Ohio in 1913, wandered through the 
South after his father’s death in 1922, working at coal mines in 
Kentucky and Alabama.109 In 1930 he chanced upon a meeting of the 
Communist-sponsored Unemployed Council in Birmingham and 
immediately found in Communism an explanation for the poverty he 
experienced and a program for eliminating its cause, capitalism.110 
He attended national meetings of the Unemployed Councils, and in 
the fall of 1930 he was arrested along with Carr for attempting to 
organize coal miners in Birmingham.111 Later, the Party sent him to 
New Orleans and then, in 1932, to Atlanta, where, paid ten dollars a 
week, he continued his organizing efforts.112 
Herndon’s presence in Atlanta resulted from strategic choices 
made by the Communist Party in the late 1920s. African Americans 
had played an important role in the Communist Party almost from its 
founding, and increasingly so in the 1920s. By the end of that decade, 
the Party was divided over whether to take organizing African 
Americans in the South as an important goal.113 The debates 
entwined esoteric disputes over Marxist theory with power struggles 
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in the Soviet Union, with Joseph Stalin using Marxist theory as his 
excuse for eliminating his opponents.114 The argument against 
organizing in the South was that revolution was not imminent in the 
United States, and that the best way to bring the revolution on, 
inevitably a long-term project, was to organize in the industrial North 
rather than the rural South.115 The argument for organizing in the 
South was that the Depression showed that capitalism was on its last 
legs, that revolution was just around the corner, and that African 
Americans in the South, oppressed by both racism and capitalism, 
would be important foot-soldiers in the revolution.116 The Party in the 
United States took the side of organizing, or more precisely Stalin 
took the side of those favoring organizing in the South, because the 
advocates of the longer-term strategy were allied with his opponents 
in the Soviet Union.117 The Party adopted a program advocating 
African American self-determination in the Black Belt, with the goal 
of establishing a separate state for African Americans, assuming that 
that was what African Americans would choose if given the 
chance.118 In January 1929, the American Communist Party formally 
adopted a program to send organizers southward.119 
Herndon’s arrest in 1932 galvanized the International Labor 
Defense (ILD), which sent its national secretary William L. Patterson 
to Atlanta to locate lawyers who could both defend Herndon and help 
in a labor defense campaign.120 Patterson first hired a prominent 
white lawyer, with whom he quickly fell out.121 Then Patterson met 
Benjamin Davis, a young black lawyer who recently graduated from 
Harvard Law School. He had the ILD retain Davis and his partner 
John Geer to defend Herndon.122 Davis and Geer agreed to the labor 
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defense approach, “legal efforts at justice within the court system and 
political efforts outside it aimed at undermining the socioeconomic 
forces which had originally inspired the prosecution.”123 
In court Davis and Geer mounted constitutional challenges to the 
indictment, to the exclusion of African Americans from the jury, and, 
eventually, to the inadequate questioning of potential jurors to 
determine whether they were prejudiced against Herndon.124 Their 
first victory was to get Herndon’s bond reduced so that he could be 
released from the jail in which he had been held from July to 
December.125 A frail young man, Herndon had continually 
complained about the physical conditions at the jail, and his release 
allowed him to go on a speaking tour as part of the labor defense 
campaign.126 
Herndon’s trial was contentious, to the point where, as historian 
Glenda Gilmore put it, Davis “walked into the packed courtroom a 
nominal Republican” and “strode out a card-carrying Communist.”127 
Prosecution and defense quarreled over the questions jurors were 
asked and the evidence the prosecution sought to introduce to show 
that Communists advocated insurrection, even though they did not try 
to show that Herndon himself had distributed or even read the 
literature they put before the jury.128 Quarrelsomeness was part of the 
labor defense strategy too; Davis and Geer tried to show jurors that, 
as the Communist newspaper the Daily Worker put it, the changes 
were a “frame-up,”129 not in the sense that Herndon had not 
organized for the Party, but in the sense that jurors ought to find 
nothing wrong with what he had done.130 The jurors were unswayed, 
and accompanied their guilty verdict with a recommendation that 
Herndon be sentenced to eighteen-to-twenty years in prison.131 
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Labor defense then moved into its next phases—an appeal to the 
Georgia Supreme Court and, more important to the ILD, a local and 
nationwide publicity campaign. A local defense group formed to 
publicize the case in Atlanta, which continued to go through a local 
Red Scare with new police raids and arrests.132 Nationally, William 
Patterson wrote, “only mass pressure can bring about the release of a 
class war prisoner,” though that pressure had to be “supplemented by 
legal defense” conducted on the highest level, presumably because 
judges had to be given some legal hook on which to hang their 
response to mass pressure.133 Herndon spoke in Washington, 
Baltimore, Philadelphia, Newark, and New York, and then in the 
Midwest where he was joined by the mother of one of the Scottsboro 
defendants.134 In New York, Herndon told his audience, “the 
Southern ruling class thought that they had just another ‘nigger’ 
case . . . but they discovered they had to take notice of millions of 
protests that came in from the masses all over the world.”135  
Much of the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision was devoted to 
trial-related issues such as the selection of jurors and the 
admissibility of testimony. At the end the court turned to evaluating 
the evidence to determine whether it was enough to support the 
conviction. Herndon came to Atlanta “as an organizer for the 
Communist Party,” and the jury could “find that his chief objective 
was to press the cause of the Communist Party.”136 So, the jury could 
consider the Party’s “program, and statutes” in assessing whether he 
was attempting to incite insurrection.137 The court then provided a 
fairly extensive summary of a booklet, “The Communist Position on 
the Negro Question,” describing the Party’s interest in self-
determination in the “Black Belt,” and concluding with the sentence, 
“[Negro Communists’] constant call to the Negro masses must be: 
Revolutionary struggle against the ruling white bourgeoisie, through 
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a fighting alliance with the revolutionary white proletariat.”138 It 
quoted Herndon’s testimony at trial: 
We know the system we are living under is on the verge of 
collapse; no matter what system we are living under, it has 
developed to its highest point and comes back—for instance, you 
can take a balloon and get so much air in it, and when you get 
too much it bursts; so with the system we are living under—of 
course, I don’t know whether that is insurrection or not, but the 
question, it has developed to its highest point139 
and asked, “Did this statement not indicate a belief that the 
conditions were opportune for a revolution or insurrection and that 
now or soon would be a seasonable time to strike?”140 The 
Communist Party and Herndon could not reasonably believe that the 
Black Belt’s self-determination could occur “by peaceful . . . and 
lawful processes.”141 The jury, the court said, could “infer that 
violence was intended.”142 The opinion concluded with a long 
quotation from Gitlow, and the statement that the “evidence 
authorized the verdict.”143 
In some ways, the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision rested on the 
same perception that animated the Communist Party’s southern 
efforts: The Black Belt was ripe for revolution, secession through 
self-determination was a realistic possibility, and it could happen 
only violently. Northern liberals saw the decision as a large threat to 
civil liberties. An editorial in The New Republic, for example, said 
that the state court’s decision illustrated “the danger of legislation 
directed against radical activities.”144 Because the decision appeared 
to “establish the principle that the ownership of any book . . . that 
advocates social change is proof of one’s determination to overthrow 
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the government,” if the decision stood, it would “block every avenue 
by which we may hope to reach a better and fuller life, and reduce 
our status as free and independent Americans to a point somewhere 
near absolute zero.”145 
Herndon’s lawyers were surprised by the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
decision. Their entire free-speech argument had been that the 
evidence presented at trial did not show that Herndon had actually 
violated the anti-insurrection statute under the standard, derived from 
Schenck, that the jury had been told to apply. The Georgia Supreme 
Court, though, upheld the conviction by interpreting the statute to 
require less evidence and finding that under the new interpretation 
there was indeed enough evidence to support Herndon’s 
conviction.146 As the lawyers saw it, this injected a new issue into the 
case: Was the anti-insurrection statute, as now construed, consistent 
with free speech principles? 
Labor defense was well and good as an organizing tool, but 
Herndon, who had complained about conditions at the jail in Atlanta, 
still faced twenty years in a Georgia prison, where the conditions 
were likely to be worse. His lawyers, of course, wanted to overturn 
his conviction. Drawing on their connections within the Communist 
Party, they contacted Carol Weiss King, a radical New York lawyer 
whose network of professional friends included Communists and 
liberals. Through her contacts at Columbia Law School, King 
recruited Walter Gellhorn, a rising star of the faculty. Gellhorn went 
to Atlanta and got another young lawyer just making his mark in 
Atlanta legal circles, W.A. Sutherland, to prepare a petition for 
rehearing in the Georgia Supreme Court, arguing that the court had 
mistakenly applied the Gitlow standard to uphold a conviction for 
attempting to incite insurrection, a Schenck-type charge. Returning to 
New York, Gellhorn in turn recruited Whitney North Seymour, a 
Wall Street lawyer who had served in the Solicitor General’s office 
during the Hoover administration, who would give the Communist 
organizer’s case a respectable face. Seymour and Gellhorn then 
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persuaded another Columbia law professor, Herbert Wechsler, to join 
them in preparing Herndon’s appeal. The final member of the 
appellate team was Elbert Tuttle, Sutherland’s partner.147 
With an eye on an appeal to the Supreme Court, Geer and 
Seymour filed the petition for rehearing in the Georgia Supreme 
Court, arguing that the statute, as it had been construed, was 
unconstitutional and that Herndon was entitled to raise the question 
then even though he had not raised it earlier because his lawyers 
could not reasonably have anticipated the new interpretation. The 
Georgia Supreme Court denied the petition. It modified its earlier 
interpretation of the statute by saying, “Force must have been 
contemplated,” but “it would be sufficient if he intended that it 
should happen at any time within which he might reasonably expect 
his influence to continue to be directly operative in causing such 
action by those whom he sought to induce.”148 Were that 
interpretation to be unconstitutional, the court continued, Herndon’s 
lawyers had to have raised their constitutional argument earlier. The 
court did not explain how Herndon’s lawyers could have anticipated 
the interpretation at any time before the court itself rendered its 
decision. 
Seymour decided to abandon the challenge to the jury’s fairness; 
under the statutes regulating the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, 
that issue could be raised only by a writ of certiorari, which the Court 
had the right to deny for any reason at all, and Seymour may have 
believed that the jury issue was unlikely to attract the Court’s 
concern. In contrast, the Court had jurisdiction by appeal in cases 
where a state statute had been upheld against a constitutional 
challenge, and it was required to determine the validity of that 
challenge on the merits—if the case was properly presented to it. 
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Seymour’s brief noted that the Georgia Supreme Court had upheld 
Herndon’s conviction by construing the state’s ban on attempting to 
incite insurrection to permit conviction without jury consideration of 
how remote the risk of insurrection was and without considering the 
likelihood that it would occur.149 That construction, Seymour 
observed, was squarely in conflict with the Court’s holdings in 
Schenck and subsequent cases. That was enough to show that there 
really was a constitutional issue in the case.150 
The fact that the Georgia Supreme Court had refused to address 
the constitutional question because it had not been properly raised in 
the trial court posed a problem for Seymour. The U.S. Supreme Court 
had jurisdiction over the case only if the constitutional claim had 
been presented to the state courts in a manner consistent with those 
courts’ procedural rules. The failure to raise the constitutional 
challenge in the trial court was hardly surprising, of course, because 
the trial judge had instructed the jury in terms drawn from Schenck. 
Had the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction by finding 
that the jury’s verdict was supported by evidence of a clear and 
present danger, the Georgia statute would have been constitutional. 
Instead, though, Seymour argued, that court came up with a different 
construction of the statute, one under which remoteness, 
circumstances, and the like were irrelevant. And, under that 
construction, the statute was unconstitutional. Herndon’s lawyers had 
raised their constitutional challenge at the first moment they could, in 
a petition for a rehearing. As Seymour’s brief put it, before the 
Georgia Supreme Court’s decision Herndon “was reasonably content 
to rest his case upon the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of 
State law to meet the standard declared by the trial court.”151 His 
lawyers were “not required to anticipate in the trial court” that the 
Georgia Supreme Court would evaluate the evidence against him 
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“under another standard which is more rigorous, and which renders 
the statute invalid.”152 
Seymour’s logic was unassailable, but it foundered on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s understanding of what the Georgia Supreme Court 
had done. Justice George Sutherland wrote the majority opinion, 
holding that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to consider 
the constitutional challenge because it had not been properly raised in 
the state courts.153 The time line of several Georgia cases, not only 
Herndon’s, was crucial for Justice Sutherland.154 He agreed that 
Herndon’s lawyers had no reason to challenge the “immediate 
serious violence” instruction initially given the jury.155 But, he 
continued, Herndon was convicted on January 18, 1933, and 
Herndon’s lawyers made a motion for a new trial.156 While that 
motion was pending in the trial court, in March 1933 the Georgia 
Supreme Court issued a decision upholding convictions under the 
anti-insurrection statute.157 In the course of that decision it referred to 
a previous decision upholding the defendants’ indictment, describing 
that earlier decision’s discussion of Gitlow and Whitney as “useful 
and salutary” in assessing the anti-insurrection statute.158 According 
to Justice Sutherland, the March decision should have signaled to 
Herndon’s lawyers that they should immediately modify their motion 
for a new trial to insert a new challenge, that the Constitution 
required the instruction the trial court had given.159 Herndon “cannot 
plead ignorance” of the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding in the 
March decision, “and was therefore bound to anticipate the 
probability of a similar ruling in his own case, and preserve his right 
to a review here by appropriate action upon the original hearing in 
the court below.”160 
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Unmentioned by Justice Sutherland was the fact that Herndon and 
his local lawyers almost certainly knew of the two decisions to which 
his opinion referred. The first rejected a pre-trial challenge by the 
Atlanta Six, including Herndon’s fellow Communist organizer 
Joseph Carr, to the constitutionality of the state’s anti-insurrection 
statute.161 The Georgia Supreme Court held that the indictments 
alleged sufficient facts to justify a conviction, should there be one.162 
In the course of upholding the indictment, the court’s opinion 
referred extensively to Gitlow and Whitney. The second upheld the 
convictions of the Atlanta Six for violating the anti-insurrection 
statute.163 
In Herndon v. Georgia, Justice Benjamin Cardozo dissented, 
joined by Justices Louis Brandeis and Harlan Fiske Stone.164 Justice 
Cardozo pointed out that under the Supreme Court’s precedents the 
standard for assessing the constitutionality of criminal anarchy 
statutes—the Gitlow standard —was different from the standard for 
assessing the constitutionality of a statute making speech criminal 
because it posed a risk of a substantive evil such as insurrection, the 
Schenck standard.165 Even a well-informed and sophisticated lawyer 
would not think that dicta referring to criminal anarchy statutes in a 
decision rejecting a challenge to an indictment as inadequate under 
Schenck had any implications for the standard the Constitution 
required that juries use in prosecutions under an anti-insurrection 
statute. Lawyers should not bother trial courts with unnecessary 
motions that rested on the guess or fear that the Georgia Supreme 
Court would confuse Gitlow-type statutes with Schenck-type ones. 
Herndon “came into the highest court of Georgia without notice that 
the statute defining his offense was to be given a new meaning. There 
had been no rejection, certainly no unequivocal rejection, of the 
doctrine of Schenck . . . .”166 
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Justice Cardozo’s analysis was completely accurate as to the law, 
but it rested on a quite careful parsing of the Georgia Supreme 
Court’s decision in the two Carr cases. Decided before Herndon’s 
trial, Carr I upheld an anti-insurrection indictment against 
constitutional challenge, in an opinion with a two-part structure.167 
After a series of quotations from Gitlow and Whitney, the opinion 
contained an extensive description of the facts alleged in the 
indictment. Based on those facts, the court allowed the prosecution to 
proceed. The opinion was ambiguous about the relation between its 
parts. The first part might have been dicta, with the indictment 
upheld because the factual allegations, if proven, would be sufficient 
to sustain a conviction under Schenck. Or, that part might have 
signaled the Georgia Supreme Court’s position that an indictment 
under a Schenck-type statute could be sustained under jury 
instructions based on Gitlow and Whitney. The ambiguity remained 
unresolved when Herndon’s case was submitted to the jury with 
instructions favoring Cardozo’s position that Schenck provided the 
applicable constitutional standard. Carr II might have been taken to 
resolve that ambiguity, except that its references to Gitlow and 
Whitney only indirectly suggested that those cases provided the 
constitutional standard. Experienced and subtle lawyers might have 
discerned from the Carr cases the position the Georgia Supreme 
Court eventually took in Herndon’s case. Davis and Geer were of 
course not experienced, and Justice Cardozo’s position, that the Carr 
decisions hardly gave ordinary lawyers clear notice of what the 
Georgia Supreme Court thought, was obviously correct. 
Yet, Justice Cardozo’s opinion did overlook the fact that confusion 
between Schenck-type statutes and Gitlow-type ones was widespread. 
Indeed, in one sense Justice Brandeis himself, concurring in Whitney, 
had argued that constitutional law should not distinguish between the 
two types of statutes, and one might say as well that the fact that a 
majority of the Supreme Court in Herndon’s case failed to draw the 
distinction was a signal that good lawyers should have anticipated the 
confusion and so should have raised the constitutional challenge 
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immediately after the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the Carr 
indictments. 
The New York Post called Justice Sutherland’s opinion “a mass of 
shabby technicalities,” a common reaction among those who 
commented on the decision.168 Law review comments were similar. 
A note in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review observed that 
the Court “is scarcely to be commended to the assiduousness with 
which it went about avoiding a decision.”169 The decision, it 
continued, “should prove distressing to those who love consistency in 
the law, as well as to those who cherish the rights of free speech of 
and racial minorities.”170 
Herndon’s case was not over with the Supreme Court’s rejection of 
his appeal. Seymour filed a petition for rehearing in the Supreme 
Court, arguing that under Georgia law Herndon’s lawyers could not 
have inserted the constitutional claim into the case by modifying their 
motion for a new trial, and otherwise quarreling with Justice 
Sutherland’s analysis. Although the Court denied the petition without 
comment, the petition mattered because it left Herndon free on bail to 
continue the labor-defense effort. The Communist Party had recently 
adopted a “Popular Front” strategy.171 Earlier it had denounced 
liberal organizations as class-traitors and collaborators with 
capitalism, but the Popular Front strategy called for alliances between 
Communists and liberals in the face of the common threat fascism 
posed.172 Herndon approached the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People for support, and the organization 
agreed to file an amicus brief on Herndon’s behalf supporting the 
petition for rehearing.173 
Herndon’s lawyers’ next move invoked Georgia’s habeas corpus 
procedure, which allowed those whose convictions had been upheld 
on direct appeal to file a habeas corpus petition for post-conviction 
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relief. Relief could be granted if the original conviction was based on 
an unconstitutional statute.174 The case was assigned to Judge Hugh 
M. Dorsey. Judge Dorsey had become notorious in liberal circles as 
the prosecutor of Leo Frank, convicted of murdering a young woman 
and then lynched when the state’s governor commuted his death 
penalty into a life sentence. Judge Dorsey had capitalized on his role 
in the Frank case to run successfully for governor, where he pursued 
moderate policies, including some moderation on issues of race. 
Elbert Tuttle, who had worked briefly as a subordinate to Judge 
Dorsey, assured Seymour that Judge Dorsey was fair-minded.175 
Tuttle’s judgment was vindicated when Judge Dorsey held the 
anti-insurrection statute unconstitutionally vague.176 To the Daily 
Worker, “The United Front freed Herndon! Onward with the United 
Front!”177 The success was short-lived, though. The Georgia 
Supreme Court quickly reversed Judge Dorsey’s decision, in a short 
opinion that merely referred to its early decision upholding 
Herndon’s conviction.178 But, having addressed the merits, the 
Georgia Supreme Court opened up its decision to review by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.179 
The briefs in the appeal of the habeas corpus decision added 
nothing new to what had been argued in the first go-round.180 
Seymour argued that the anti-insurrection statute was 
unconstitutional as construed by the Georgia Supreme Court because 
it allowed the jury to convict Herndon without finding the kind of 
close connection Schenck required between what he said and the 
possibility that insurrection would actually occur. True, the jury had 
been instructed properly, but the Georgia Supreme Court evaluated 
Herndon’s conviction by using a looser standard. Were the proper 
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standard to be applied, Seymour argued, the conviction was not 
supported by sufficient evidence. The state’s brief suggested that the 
Court abandon the “clear and present danger” test for the older “bad 
tendency” test that Schenck had rejected. 
A five-justice majority of the Supreme Court rejected Georgia’s 
innovative suggestion, and applied Schenck, or at least purported to 
do so.181 Saying that the state’s power “to abridge freedom of speech 
. . . is the exception rather than the rule,”182 Justice Owen Robert’s 
largely pedestrian opinion drew the appropriate distinction between 
Schneck-type cases and Gitlow-type ones and cited De Jonge to show 
that state laws had to have an “appropriate relation to the safety of 
the state.”183 Reading the state court’s decisions, Justice Roberts 
concluded that the state court had necessarily construed its statute to 
mean that “one who seeks members for . . . a party which has the 
purposes and objects disclosed by the documents in evidence may be 
found guilty of an attempt to incite insurrection.”184 
That construction led Justice Roberts to examine the evidence 
against Herndon closely. Justice Roberts noted Georgia’s “especial[]” 
reliance on the booklet The Communist Position on the Negro 
Question, which he described in detail.185 Did Herndon incite 
insurrection by inducing people to join the Communist Party: 
by reason of the fact that they agreed to abide by the tenets of the 
party, some of them lawful, others, as may be assumed, 
unlawful, in the absence of proof that he brought the unlawful 
aims to their notice . . . or that the fantastic program they 
envisaged was conceived of by any one as more than an ultimate 
ideal?186 
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As construed, the statute did not allow the judge and jury to “appraise 
the circumstances and character of the defendant’s utterances or 
activities as begetting a clear and present danger of forcible 
obstruction of a particular state function.”187 Rather, the jury could 
convict if it concluded that “any act or utterance” Herndon made “in 
opposition to the established order . . . might, in the distant future, 
eventuate in a combination to offer forcible resistance to the state.”188 
He did not have to “advocate resort to force,” and indeed, Justice 
Roberts wrote, had Herndon merely “forecast that, as a result of a 
chain of causation, following his proposed action a group may arise 
at some future date . . . resort to force,” he could be found guilty.189 
The scope of potential liability, as Justice Roberts described it, was 
enormous: 
Every person who attacks existing conditions, who agitates for a 
change in the form of government, must take the risk that if a 
jury should be of opinion he ought to have foreseen that his 
utterances might contribute in any measure to some future 
forcible resistance to the existing government, he may be 
convicted . . . .190 
Phrases such as “reasonably might foretell” and “some time in the 
indefinite future” were the hallmarks of a statute that restricted 
freedom of speech far too much.191 Georgia’s statute “as construed 
and applied, amounts merely to a dragnet which may enmesh any one 
who agitates for a change of government if a jury can be persuaded 
that he ought to have foreseen his words would have some effect in 
the future conduct of others.”192 
Justice Roberts and his colleagues in the majority said that they 
were only following through on the logic of Schenck and its concern 
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that juries might be enflamed by local and national passions against 
radical dissenters who posed no serious threat to the government’s 
stability. The Four Horsemen, led by Justice Willis Van Devanter, 
disagreed. Their concurrence in De Jonge showed that they had no 
quarrel with the principles Justice Roberts articulated. They did 
think, though, that the evidence showed a greater threat than the 
majority acknowledged. They found the program for the Black Belt, 
as elaborated in the booklet from which Justice Van Devanter quoted 
extensively, far more dangerous than the majority had it.193 Justice 
Van Devanter pointed out that the booklet “was particularly adapted 
to appeal to negroes” in the South, “for it pictured their condition as 
an unhappy one.”194 As had the Georgia Supreme Court, Justice Van 
Devanter’s analysis unconsciously echoed the Communist Party’s 
understanding: Proposing to create an independent state in the Black 
Belt “was nothing short of advising a resort to force and violence, for 
all know that such measures could not be effected otherwise.”195 
Given this threat, the state was entitled to convict Herndon if the jury 
found that illegal action might take place “at any time within which 
[Herndon] might reasonably expect his influence to continue to be 
directly operative.”196 
This might well have been a reasonable interpretation of what 
“clear and present danger” meant in the context of the World War I 
cases, which had, after all, upheld the convictions in Abrams197 under 
circumstances where the likelihood of anyone doing anything serious 
was far smaller than the threat in the South during the Depression. 
The nation, though, was more than a decade beyond the World War I 
prosecutions and the Red Scare of the early 1920s, and “clear and 
present danger” had come to mean something more stringent than it 
had in the early 1920s. Justice Roberts’s opinion applied the test as it 
had come to be understood by 1937.198 
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CONCLUSION 
Historian Glenda Gilmore connects Herndon v. Lowry to the 
“switch in time.”199 Editorial reactions to Herndon v. Lowry similarly 
read it against the background of Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan. To 
the New York Times, the decision showed that the Court’s critics 
overlooked the fact that the Court stood in the way of “injustice, 
hysteria and tyranny,” and was “the guardian of civil rights belonging 
to even the humblest citizen.”200 The St. Louis Post-Dispatch said 
that the decision showed that the Court “again stands out in bold 
relief as an indispensable bulwark of human rights against invasion 
by unwarranted governmental authority.”201 For liberal columnist 
Heywood Broun five-to-four decisions favoring civil liberties were 
fine, but “they are not good enough to stand as fundamental 
settlements of pressing problems, since it is not beyond the bounds of 
experience for a Justice of the Supreme Court to change his mind.”202 
Unlike the claims about Justice Roberts’s change in position in West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, this one is at least unembarrassed by a 
question of timing. Roosevelt announced the Court-packing plan on 
Friday, February 5, 1937; Herndon v. Lowry was argued three days 
later, on Monday, February 8, 1937. And, Justice Roberts’s 
evaluation of the evidence against Herndon was quite searching and 
skeptical. 
Yet, the association of Herndon v. Lowry with the switch-in-time 
seems strained. Roosevelt had made it clear that the Court-packing 
plan was aimed at getting the Court out of the horse-and-buggy age 
so that it would uphold New Deal initiatives. Whatever Justice 
Roberts might have thought about the threat Court-packing posed to 
the Court, he could not reasonably have believed that Roosevelt or 
anyone else likely to go after the Court’s power cared in the slightest 
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about how the Court dealt with domestic radicals. Herndon v. Lowry 
is better understood as another step in the Court’s gradual distancing 
itself from its decisions in the aftermath of the Red Scare of the 
1920s. In Schenck Holmes had written, “When a nation is at war 
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance 
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men 
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right.”203 This was simultaneously a suggestion that the 
constitutional rule should be applied differently in peacetime than in 
wartime and a prediction about what courts would do. De Jonge and 
Herndon v. Lowry confirmed both the doctrinal differences between 
war and peace, and Holmes’s prediction. Perhaps enough Justices 
came to think that they had overreacted in approving too much of 
what had been done in the 1920s that they chose to employ the 
framework of those decisions to reach results in De Jonge and 
Herndon v. Lowry more tolerant of radical dissent. They may have 
been encouraged to do so by the fact that, unlike what had happened 
in the 1920s, the federal government abstained from serious attacks 
on domestic radicalism in the 1930s. De Jonge and Herndon v. 
Lowry are undoubtedly different in tone from Gitlow and Whitney, 
though not on their face different in doctrine. But, the differences did 
not arise from the dramatic events of early 1937. They had deeper 
roots. 
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